Abstract. Using a technique developed by Coquand and Hofmann [3] we verify that adding the analytical form MP1: ∀α(¬¬∃xα(x) = 0 → ∃xα(x) = 0) of Markov's Principle does not increase the class of Π 0 2 formulas provable in Kleene and Vesley's formal system for intuitionistic analysis, or in subsystems obtained by omitting or restricting various axiom schemas in specified ways.
Introduction
In [6] Kleene proved that Markov's Principle MP 1 is neither provable nor refutable in his formal system I for intuitionistic analysis. By the FriedmanDragalin translation, Markov's Rule is admissible for I and many subsystems.
We show that adding MP 1 as an axiom to I does not increase consistency strength, in the sense that no additional Π 0 2 formulas become provable. The method, adapted from Coquand and Hofmann's dynamic modification [3] of the Friedman-Dragalin translation, works also for subsystems of I with a few interesting exceptions.
1. Language, logic, and basic mathematical axioms 1.1. The two-sorted formal language and intuitionistic predicate logic. Kleene and Vesley's language L 1 for two-sorted intuitionistic number theory or "intuitionistic analysis" has variables a,b,c,. . . ,x,y,z,. . . , intended to range over natural numbers; variables α, β, γ, . . ., intended to range over one-place numbertheoretic functions (choice sequences); finitely many constants 0, , +, ·, f 4 , . . . , f p , each representing a primitive recursive function or functional, where f i has k i places for number arguments and l i places for type-1 function arguments; parentheses indicating function application; and Church's λ.
The terms (of type 0) and functors (of type 1) are defined inductively as follows. The number variables and 0 are terms. The function variables and each f i with k i = 1, l i = 0 are functors. If t 1 , . . . , t k i are terms and u 1 , . . . , u l i are functors, then f i (t 1 , . . . , t k i , u 1 , . . . , u l i ) is a term. If x is a number variable and t is a term, then λx.t is a functor. And if u is a functor and t is a term, then (u)(t) is a term.
There is one relation symbol = for equality between terms; equality between functors u, v is defined extensionally by u = v ≡ ∀x(u(x) = v(x)) (where x is not free in u or v). The atomic formulas of L 1 are the expressions s = t where s, t are terms. Composite formulas are defined inductively, using the connectives &, ∨, →, ¬, quantifiers ∀, ∃ of both sorts, and parentheses (often omitted under the usual conventions on scope). A ↔ B is defined by (A → B) & (B → A).
The logical axioms and rules are those of two-sorted intuitionistic predicate logic, as presented in [6] (building on [4] ). If the intuitionistic axiom schema ¬A → (A → B) were replaced by ¬¬A → A (of which Markov's Principle MP 1 is a special case), two-sorted classical predicate logic would result.
1.2. Two-sorted intuitionistic arithmetic IA 1 . This is a conservative extension, in the language L 1 , of the first-order intuitionistic arithmetic IA 0 in [4] based on =, 0, , +, ·. The mathematical axioms of IA 1 are:
(a) The axiom-schema of mathematical induction (for all formulas of L 1 ):
The axioms of IA 0 for =, 0, , +, · (axioms 14-21 on page 82 of [4] ) and the axioms expressing the primitive recursive definitions of the additional function constants f 4 , . . . , f 26 given in [6] and [5] .
The axiom-schema of λ-conversion: (λx.t(x))(s) = t(s), where t(x) is a term and s is free for x in t(x). For readers familiar with [6] , IA 1 is the subsystem of the "basic system" B obtained by omitting the axiom schemas of countable choice and bar induction ( x 2.1 and x 26.3, respectively).
In addition to the open equality axiom (c), the equality axioms
are provable for all function constants f i . Thus IA 1 satisfies the replacement property of equality for functors as well as for terms. IA 1 can only prove the existence of primitive recursive sequences, in the sense that each closed theorem of the form ∃αA(α) has a primitive recursive witness. The finite list of primitive recursive function constants, with their corresponding axioms, is intended to be expanded as needed. Here we use the λ notation to explicitly define termwise multiplication of sequences: (α · β) will abbreviate λx(α(x) · β(x)). We also define sg(α) = λx.sg(α(x)), in effect adding binary sequence variables to L 1 . 
, and f26(y) = ccp(y) represents the course-of-values function for the characteristic function of the predicate "y is a computation tree number." These suffice for Kleene's formal treatment ([5] Part I) of recursive partial functionals, including the recursion theorem and a normal form theorem.
where α, x must be free for y in A(x, y). Intuitionistic recursive analysis IRA can be axiomatized, as a subsystem of Kleene and Vesley's B, by IA 1 + qf-AC 00 , where qf-AC 00 is the restriction of AC 00 to formulas A(x, y) without sequence quantifiers and with only bounded number quantifiers. IRA ensures that the range of the type-1 variables contains all general recursive sequences and is closed under general recursive processes. Troelstra's EL and Veldman's BIM are alternative axiomatizations of IRA, cf.
[8], [7] .
In the two-sorted language, IRA + MP 1 + CT 1 formalizes Russian recursive analysis (RUSS in [2] ), where MP 1 is the functional form of Markov's Principle
and CT 1 expresses Church's Thesis:
The general recursive functions form a classical ω-model of RUSS and hence of IRA, but RUSS + AC 00 (unlike IRA + AC 00 ) is inconsistent with classical logic. (
Definition of the
Proofs. (a) holds by intuitionistic logic, (b) is proved by formula induction, and the replacement property of equality for functors guarantees (c).
Proof. Only Cases 4 and 5 require attention. If E is A → B where A, B both satisfy the lemma, assume (A → B) α & γ = α · β. If A sg(δ) then B α·δ by definition of (A → B) α , and δ · γ = (α · δ) · β so B δ·γ by the induction hypothesis on B. So (A → B) γ .
If E is ¬A where A satisfies the lemma, assume (¬A)
Proofs. (a) follows immediately from the definition and Proposition 2.2(b) with the fact that
For (b), the implication from left to right follows from (a) by logic. For the converse assume ∀α ∈ 2 N (A α → B α ) and α ∈ 2 N and A sg(β) ; then B sg(β) by the assumption, so B β by Proposition 2.2(b), so B α·β by Lemma 2.3. So (A → B) α .
2.6. Lemma. If E is ∃x α(x) = 0 (i.e., Z(α)) then IA 1 proves:
(a) is immediate by Definition 2.1 with intuitionistic logic. For (b), under the assumption β ∈ 2 N and using (a), Proposition 2.2, intuitionistic logic and the fact that β · β = β, we have the following chain of equivalences:
For (c), under the assumption β ∈ 2 N , by (b) we have 3. Applications to Subsystems of Kleene's Formal System I for Intuitionistic Analysis 3.1. Theorem. If T is a theory extending IA 1 by axioms and axiom schemas F 1 , . . . , F n such that T ∀β ∈2 N (F i ) β for i = 1, . . . , n, and if E is derivable in T from assumptions A 1 , . . . , A m with all free variables held constant in the deduction, then E β is derivable in T from the assumptions β ∈ 2 N , (A 1 ) β ,. . . ,(A m ) β with all free variables held constant. Proof. IA 1 ∀α ∈ 2 N E α when E is any axiom of IA 1 , using the lemmas in the previous section with ∀α ∈ 2 N (α · α = α) as appropriate (e.g. for the mathematical induction schema). If B β and (B → C) β are derivable in IA 1 from β = sg(β), (A 1 ) β ,. . . ,(A m ) β with the free variables held constant, then by Lemma 2.5(a) so is B β → C β , and therefore also C β . Similarly for the other rules of inference.
3.2.
Lemma. IA 1 + AC 00 ∀β ∈ 2 N (AC 00 ) β , and similarly for qf-AC 00 , AC 01 .
Proofs. By the definition with Lemma 2.5(b).
3.3. Lemma. IA 1 + BI 1 ∀β ∈ 2 N (BI 1 ) β where BI 1 is the bar induction schema
By Lemma 2.5 it will be enough to prove A β ( ). By the definition and the lemmas in the previous section, over IA 1 the numbered assumptions are equivalent respectively to
In IA 1 we may define σ ∈ 2 N so that
From (i') it follows immediately that ∀α∃xσ(α(x) = 0). From (ii') with γ = β and the fact that
3.4. Lemma. IA 1 + CC 10 ∀β ∈ 2 N (CC 10 ) β where CC 10 is
CC 10 is a minor variation of, and is equivalent over IA 1 + qf-AC 00 to, Kleene and Vesley's continuous choice schema * 27.2 ("Brouwer's Principle for numbers"). Proof. Assume β ∈ 2 N and ∀α∃xA β (α, x). By Lemma 2.5(b) it will be enough to find a σ such that for all α:
. CC 10 provides a σ such that for all α:
(i') ∃y σ(α(y)) > 0 and
Obviously (i') entails (i). To prove (ii), let y ∈ N and γ ∈ 2 N . If σ(α(y)) > 0 then A β·γ (α, σ(α(y)−1)) by (ii') with Lemma 2.3, and if Z(γ) then A β·γ (α, σ(α(y)−1)) by Lemmas 2.4 and 2.3, so σ(α(y)) > 0 ∨ Z(γ) → A β·γ (α, σ(α(y)−1)).
3.5. Lemma. IA 1 + qf-AC 00 + CC 11 ∀γ ∈ 2 N (CC 11 ) γ where CC 11 is
which is equivalent over IA 1 + qf-AC 00 to Kleene's strongest continuous choice principle, "Brouwer's Principle for functions" (axiom schema x 27.1 in [6] ).
Proof. Assume γ ∈ 2 N and ∀α∃βA γ (α, β). By Lemma 2.5(b) it will be enough to find a σ such that
CC 11 provides a σ such that
which suffices by the definition with Lemma 2.3. 
If E is ∀x∃yA(x, y) where A(x, y) has only bounded numerical quantifiers, then A(x, y) is equivalent over IA 1 to a formula of the type described in Lemma 2.7(c), so by Theorem 3.1: if T + MP 1 E then T E λz.1 so T E.
3.7. Remarks. Lemma 2.7(c) holds also for formulas E constructed from prime formulas and their negations using only &, ∨, ∀ and ∃, in particular for all prenex formulas. It follows, for each subsystem T of Kleene's I described in the statement of Corollary 3.6, that any prenex formula provable in T + MP 1 is provable in T.
Kleene's original versions of the continuous choice principles would also satisfy Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5 over IA 1 + qf-AC 00 . By Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 2.5, the equivalences between our versions and Kleene's persist under the translation, and the proofs for CC 10 and CC 11 are simpler.
The question whether or not the "minimal" system M = IA 1 + AC 00 ! proves the same Π 0 2 formulas as M + MP 1 is still open, as far as we know, because (∀x∃!yA(x, y)) α does not entail ∀x∃!yA α (x, y) unless α = λx.1. However, if
is the axiom of countable choice for two alternatives, then IRA + AC ∨ 00 + MP 1 is Π 0 2 -conservative over IRA + AC ∨ 00 by Theorem 3.1. Since AC 00 ! is equivalent over IRA to ∀x(A(x) ∨ ¬A(x)) → ∃α∀x(α(x) = 0 ↔ A(x)) by [7] , any prenex formula provable in M + MP 1 is provable in IRA + AC ∨ 00 . Because the translation E → E β essentially involves binary sequence quantifiers, it does not appear to solve the corresponding problem for IA 1 + AC Ar 00 or for Solovay's system S = IA 1 + AC Ar 00 + BI 1 , where AC Ar 00 is the restriction of AC 00 to arithmetical formulas A(x, y) (with sequence parameters allowed). In the presence of bar induction, arithmetical countable choice interacts strongly with MP 1 ; e.g. Solovay showed that the classical version S + (¬¬A → A) of S can be interpreted negatively in IRA + BI 1 + MP 1 .
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In fact, his proof justifies a stronger result: S + (¬¬A → A) can be interpreted negatively in IRA + BI1 + DNS1, where DNS1 is the schema ∀α¬¬∃xA(α(x)) → ¬¬∀α∃xA(α(x)) for quantifier-free formulas A(w). Another note with this and related results is in progress.
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